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T

he combat-centric legacy of the US Army is stable and durable. It developed during World War II and has persisted relatively intact throughout
the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, and even in the post-9/11 era. The
legacy endures not only in organizational form, doctrine, and equipment but
also in training, education, and culture. Its persistence impedes the ability to
conduct either sequential full-spectrum operations (occurring in traditional
multiphase operations) or simultaneous full-spectrum operations (occurring
in complex insurgencies such as those manifesting in Operations Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF)). And it dramatically limits the US
Army’s capacity to adapt to other noncombat or untraditional roles and missions. The stability of the legacy, despite the experiences of OIF, typifies the
inertial qualities of the institutional US Army, which has, as Brigadier Nigel
Aylwin-Foster describes, “developed over time a singular focus on conventional warfare.”1 Furthermore, the legacy signifies a rejection of the hardfought organizational adaptations realized in Iraq that made the force more
full-spectrum capable than perhaps it had ever been.
The Army’s combat legacy required substantial organizational adaptation throughout OIF principally because combat skills did not translate
into full-spectrum capabilities. The Army’s combat orientation retarded the
force’s ability to adapt structurally and cognitively so as to modify organizational inputs (training, equipment, intelligence production, etc.) and outputs
(task performance competency, behavior, etc.) to achieve organizational
goals and objectives in pursuit of national interests. Significant and substantial modification was required to transform an institution with a combat legacy into one capable of conducting simultaneous full-spectrum operations
in support of strategy. The duration and degree of adaptation in OIF are relevant if imprecise measurements of how unsuitable the post-9/11 force was
for translating tactical and operational action and success into strategic and
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political victory. Whether the adaptive and truly full-spectrum capable force
created under fire during OIF will be retained in the future is unclear, but
early indications suggest that a return to the legacy through “modernization”
and “rebalancing” is not only likely but preferred despite strategic requirements. Instead of focusing on rebalancing, modernization, and a return to a
combat-centric, legacy force, the Army should instead incorporate lessons
from OIF to create a truly full-spectrum proficient force capable of supporting national interests and strategic requirements.
Full-spectrum Capabilities, Balance, and Modernization
The definition of the term full-spectrum is difficult to discern given
the differing qualities that are attributed to this capability. In one sense, being
full-spectrum capable refers to the capacity for fighting future combat-centric wars. In the 2008 Army Posture Statement, then-Secretary of the Army
Pete Geren and Chief of Staff George Casey wrote, “To reset our force [because of the imbalance caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan] we must
prepare our soldiers, units, and equipment for future deployments and other
contingencies . . . [and] retrain our soldiers to accomplish the full spectrum of
missions they will be expected to accomplish.”2 In another sense, being fullspectrum capable means maintaining the capacity to fight a range of threats
in a multitude of environments. Major Mark Calhoun contends that “because
a return to the Army’s tradition of ‘small wars’ appears to be the primary
characteristic of current and future operations, a transformation process that
relies on long-range destruction of targets seems anything but ‘full-spectrum.’”3 Although there is no published definition for full-spectrum capability, a definition exists for full-spectrum dominance that decidedly suggests
(despite experience) that combat capability neatly and fluidly translates into
full-spectrum capability. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, defines full-spectrum dominance as “the cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and
information environment that permits the conduct of joint operations without
effective opposition or prohibitive interference.”4 One need not employ divination to conclude that the official use of the term full spectrum does not actually refer to the range of operations on this spectrum but only the narrower
band(s) of combat. The prevailing sentiment encapsulated in the 2008 Army
Posture Statement indicates that skills falling outside of this band necessarily detract from full-spectrum capabilities, while skills within the band are
transcendent and enable full-spectrum capabilities. Therefore, the mindset of
mistaking combat capable to mean full-spectrum capable endures.
The term balance, related to but not (yet) synonymous with full-spectrum, is nearly as indecipherable. On the one hand, the current force, initially
and presently designed for high intensity conflict (HIC) in major combat op48
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erations (MCO), is arguably unbalanced in favor of short-duration conflicts
involving almost exclusively combat capabilities at the expense of future warmaking capacity. According to Thomas Donnelly and Frederick Kagan:
Today’s wars are being fought with armed forces designed in the
1980s to excel in a different kind of combat—short-term, high-intensity combat that was expected to lead to rapid and complete victory or
defeat in one major theater. Priority was given to getting soldiers and
tanks into the fight quickly in the belief that support elements, headquarters, and reinforcements could follow more slowly. But this priority is out of sync with today’s needs and has created an imbalanced
active-duty force that faces grave challenges in sustaining long-term
deployments and carrying out its varied, numerous missions.5

On the other hand, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Admiral
Mike Mullen argues, the current force is unbalanced in favor of long-duration conflicts involving everything but combat capabilities at the expense of
future warmaking capacity:
The pace of ongoing operations has prevented our forces from training for full-spectrum operations and impacts our ability to be ready
to counter future threats. This lack of balance is unsustainable in the
long-term. We must balance the strategic depth requirement for longterm national security against the pace of ongoing operations.6

It is supposed then that current conflicts are anomalies that will not
be repeated, either by choice or because these enemies will not rematerialize
elsewhere; strategy has changed or will significantly change from its present
form;7 and the future is full of enemies radically dissimilar than those currently found in the international security environment.8 None of these suppositions is warranted by experience or changes in the international security
environment in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods.9
The amount of time that the US Army spent tactically adapting to
achieve goals and objectives in the simultaneous full-spectrum environment
of Iraq indicates just how unprepared (or out of balance) the Army was for fullspectrum operations despite claims to the contrary. Prior to the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, organizational inputs and outputs were almost exclusively tied to the
conduct of combat to the detriment of any other conceivable or actual operation. This is the nature of adaptation: If an organization is perfectly suited to
accomplishing one objective (HIC), then it is inherently less suited to accomplishing other, differing objectives. Paradoxically, the 2008 Army Modernization Strategy reverses this relationship and argues that expanding capabilities
to meet strategic objectives has made the force less full-spectrum capable. The
2008 Army Modernization Strategy states that “the pace of operations coupled
with insufficient time between deployments is forcing the Army to focus on
counterinsurgency training and equipping to the detriment of preparing for
full-spectrum operations.”10 This claim suggests that the US Army’s efforts
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to become a full-spectrum capable force in OIF actually diminished its abilities by thinning its capacity to engage in HIC or MCO. There is some truth
to this claim. As Admiral Mullen argues, “The imbalance between our readiness for future global missions and the wars we are fighting today limits our
capacity to respond to future contingencies, and offers potential adversaries,
both state and nonstate, incentives to act.”11 There is also quite a bit of truth to
the argument that were the US Army not so fundamentally incapable of conducting full-spectrum operations in support of strategic imperatives on the eve
of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, such a radical adaptation would not have been
required and the force would not be out of balance, however balance is defined. Additionally, it is highly likely that potential future adversaries learned
quite a bit from this process and will react accordingly by dispersing operations across the spectrum.12 It should also be noted that combat is only one band
of the spectrum of conflict and that many other bands, tied to force and mission
requirements, exist. The capabilities required for their execution have expanded dramatically in the course of recent conflicts.
Transcendent Effects of the Combat Legacy
A preference for a return to the pre-OIF balance and full-spectrum
capabilities is not hard to understand given how difficult these missions are
to accomplish. Pre-OIF full-spectrum dominance is where the US Army has
historically excelled, and it would again like to obtain that status in the future. Conversely, post-OIF capabilities and dominance necessitate a new set
of training, doctrine, and skills that is difficult to discern and would require
significant and continuous organizational adaptation, regardless of what structural changes are made in the future. Determining the meaning of full-spectrum capable is necessary for determining the direction the US Army will be
going and how long it will take to get there. If the 2008 Army Modernization
Strategy and “CJCS Guidance for 2008-2009” comprise the Rosetta stone for
this decipherment, then it seems that the pre-9/11 definition of full-spectrum
prevails and the Army will continue a gradual shift toward a combat-centric
force and away from the full-spectrum force developed in Iraq.
Outside of the related definition of full-spectrum dominance, it is difficult to determine what the term “full-spectrum capable” really implies.
Supposedly, the force that was deployed to Afghanistan and later Iraq was
full-spectrum capable because of its technical capabilities; this was quickly
disproven variously by warlords, militias, criminal entrepreneurs, and insurgents for hire, resulting in four years of rampant instability in Iraq. An initial
inability to manage these threats resulted in three years of organizational adaptation that ultimately redirected strategy and aligned it with operational
improvements and tactical success. But it is argued that redirecting the Army’s
focus to the lower-end of the conflict spectrum was not sufficient to ensure an
50
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expansion of full-spectrum capabilities. As Major Jerome Hawkins explains, focusing on the lower-end of the spectrum of conflict has “come at the cost of
training preparation for more traditional threats, and the Army’s abiliIn a rapidly changing security
ty to attack and defend. Neglecting
environment, doctrine should
training for conflict on the high- be dynamic but not to the point
er-end of the spectrum of conflict
that it is in constant flux.
degrades the Army’s ability to conduct full-spectrum operations.”13
Being full-spectrum capable then becomes a matter of perspective: One perspective defines full-spectrum capable as the capacity to engage a range of
threats and another defines it as the capacity to engage traditional, combatcentric threats. The fact is, neither is assured in the future as the US Army continues to transform, modernize, and rebalance itself.
It appears as though the combat-centric, full-spectrum capable proponents are prevailing despite Department of Defense leadership advocating
a different outcome. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly made
the case for expanding the capability of all forces across the spectrum and
for inculcating the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan: “Even the biggest
wars will require ‘small wars’ capabilities.”14 Secretary Gates also argues that
while “having a military skilled in fighting major conventional ground wars
is essential . . . such a war is unlikely in the near future.”15 He continues by
emphasizing that “the Pentagon has placed comparatively too much emphasis on developing high-technology weapon systems aimed at potential state
adversaries such as China or Russia that take years to develop,” noting that
the 2009 budget contains more than $180 billion for such conventional systems.16 Despite Secretary Gates’s stewardship and management, many in
the Army’s leadership make a powerful contrarian case that advocates following the standard prescription of the legacy: developing combat-capable
forces proficient in fighting a near-peer adversary.17
Change is difficult in any bureaucracy, and there is always the risk of
damaging the organization’s capabilities. When charged with providing for
the nation’s defense, change can be difficult, daunting, and potentially catastrophic. As Colin Gray suggests, “Often it is said that it is more difficult to
expel an old idea than to introduce a new one. Because we only have one
army, we cannot afford to deprogram our regulars, even were such mental
surgery possible.”18 The entrenchment of a legacy is natural for any organization, even when it may be confronted with direct evidence that its legacy is
unsuited for present and future operations. As Colonel John Waghelstein asserts, “If anyone is stunned and amazed that the US Army is having difficulties in Iraq, they should not be. There is seemingly something in the Army’s
DNA that historically precludes it from preparing itself for the problems of
insurgency or from studying such conflicts in any serious way until the dam
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breaks.”19 But the influence of the legacy’s stability is troubling. Warfare, always a messy business, is becoming even more challenging, and commonly
accepted paradigms for categorizing aspects of warfare are mutating. According to Secretary Gates, “The categories of warfare are blurring and no longer
fit into neat, tidy boxes.”20 Despite the comprehensive tactical adaptations that
the Army made in Iraq and is currently making in Afghanistan, it is still locked
in a battle to “balance” capabilities with missions. But balancing to achieve a
full-spectrum capable force, in the traditional sense, defies the ostensible definition of the term and confounds the adaptations resulting from Iraq.
Implications for Strategy
The Army crossed an operational Rubicon during OIF. There is no
longer a combat-equivalent equilibrium because the spectrum of conflict
has essentially been collapsed, perhaps irrevocably. Since there are infinite
combinations of organizations and threat methodologies available to adversaries, there is a wide range of possibilities along the entire spectrum of
conflict. Thus, success in modern warfare will require the ability to integrate
and accomplish full-spectrum tasks simultaneously. As long as national interests demand military strategies ensuring some degree of stability, and as
long as instability and violence plague the international security environment, the Army will have to be prepared to conduct the entire range of military operations, perhaps simultaneously. These operations require a force
capable of maintaining a robust capacity for organizational adaptation.21
Even if the US government chooses not to intervene in regional conflicts where national interests might be at stake, the Army still needs to maintain the capacity for restoring stability. In the future, events in the Western
Hemisphere may directly threaten the continental United States. The key to
retaining strategic flexibility will be maintaining the adaptability of the individual soldier and tactical organizations, so regardless of where they are
deployed they will be capable of adapting and accomplishing their missions.
Considering the adaptive potential of various states and nonstate threats, any
organizational and operational weaknesses are assured of being exploited. It
is imperative that the Army pursues and resources organizational adaptability in its effort to maintain a range of strategic options. With a larger army
this adaptability is prudent; with a smaller force, it is critical.
Counterinsurgencies and unconventional operations are adaptive contests. According to Steven Metz, “Each [organization] tries to learn, adapt,
and change what they are doing more quickly than the other.”22 Forming an
adaptive organization and inculcating the appropriate mindset are difficult
tasks, no matter the operational environment or the threat. In the absence
of leadership that persistently emphasizes the necessity of fostering organizational adaptation, the Army will likely rebalance toward a more familiar
52
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but less adaptive organizational form. As Leonard Wong argues, “Adaptive
leaders learn to live with unpredictability. They spend less time fretting about
the inability to establish a routine
or control the future and focus
The key to retaining strategic
more on exploiting opportuniflexibility
will be maintaining
ties.”23 Failing to institutionalthe adaptability of the individual
ize the adaptations of OIF will soldier and tactical organizations.
leave the Army unable to successfully deal with unpredictable threats and less capable of recognizing and exploiting opportunities in
the future.
Recognizing instability as a major threat to US interests is a common
theme of recent defense strategies. Developing supporting military strategies
that effectively meet the challenges associated with instability in the international security environment is a fundamental task. States and nonstate organizations may threaten stability by exercising initiatives that disrupt world
order. If stability of the global order (as it currently exists) is a desired condition, then the Army should be organized and resourced to provide full-spectrum capabilities toward that end. US Army strategy needs to recognize that
conditions dictate operational methods and not vice versa.24 Political and strategic contexts shape future strategic direction.25 Combat, counterterrorism,
humanitarian, and unconventional are simply terms used to describe various
operations, methodologies, or capabilities that facilitate operations. Stability
is the condition or desired end-state that actually has political relevance and
vitality. Creating stability in future threat environments requires full-spectrum
capabilities and significant organizational adaptation.
Since the beginning of the Defense Transformation program, the Joint
Staff, including the US Army, has been mistaking objectives for strategy, capabilities for end-states, and the preferred for the likely. These errors and
omissions have caused confusion in perceptions of the threat and masked the
need for organizational adaptation. Andrew Krepinevich argues that strategic publications in the 1990s, such as Joint Vision 2020, indicated that “information superiority” was the means for enabling “dominant maneuver,”
“precision engagement,” “focused logistics,” and “full-dimensional protection.” Strategy was reduced to assertions “that the conditions desired will be
achieved,” and the need for considering resource limitations or enemy action was obviated. In sum, the need for real strategy was assumed away.26
Other strategic requirements, such as the need for stability provisioning capabilities, were also assumed away, creating a substantial capability gap
unrecognized by those enchanted with the possibilities engendered by transformation. In fact, many of the proponents of this strategy argued for a shift
away from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning and operations. Ignoring the need for other-than-combat capabilities and mistaking obSpring 2010
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jectives for strategy had significant operational consequences throughout the
post-Cold War period.
Strategy necessitates that such thinking has to change. According to
Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, “To be successful in future operations, the Army cannot look at operations today as
temporary interruptions in preparing for major combat operations against a
near-peer enemy. Nor can it afford to view operations dominated by the offense and defense and those dominated by stability as either/or propositions.
Both usually occur simultaneously.”27 Strategy needs to reflect national interests formulated with respect to the organizations threatening these interests.
Differing levels of stability are likely to be acceptable in various regions of the world, based on US national interests, strategic priorities, and perceptions of risk. Stability in Europe is certainly strategically more important
than, for instance, stability in Central Asia, and providing stability in Bosnia
might be less complex than in Pakistan. Therefore, in our foundation of strategy and doctrine, stability should be viewed on a continuous spectrum. Although FM 3-07, Stability Operations, does develop a framework for fragile
states and a comprehensive set of stability operations tasks, these actions are
not the same as developing a spectrum of stability.28 In this new paradigm,
the level of stability required by strategy dictates the operational parameters
and tasks chosen (combat, stability, offensive, defensive, humanitarian, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, etc.). Instead of modifying conditions to tasks
trained, the tasks trained should be modified to achieve desired conditions.
Although this change might seem like sleight of hand, it makes more sense
to link tasks to desired end-states than it does to link tasks to varying levels
or types of conflict. Conflict implies achieving victory through the imposition
of military force; stability implies achieving a condition through the performance of a variety of fused tasks across the entire spectrum.
Focusing on stability in military strategy would not only align military planning with national interests, it would aid in the synchronization of
military operations with political needs. Military strategies would then be
less prone to possible failure, as in Vietnam, or Iraq prior to the surge.29 It
would also elevate the importance of various forms of intervention in attempts to provide stability before instability spreads from a city to the state
or region, in the form of a massive, multiform insurgency. The best opportunity to defeat an insurgency is in its nascent stage. The amount of time and
resources required for an organization to adapt to a particular strategic environment can be an indicator of a failure in organizational design and its
preparation for goal accomplishment. Given current and future national and
strategic security interests, preparing for operations on the spectrum of stability would ultimately reduce the severity of painful and lengthy organizational adaptations.
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Implications for Doctrine
Since the end of the Cold War, Army doctrine has reflected a conditioned bias for planning, training, and conducting combat operations. Even
recent doctrinal publications still retain vestiges of concepts that are significantly less relevant in the post-9/11 security environment. For instance,
Field Manual 3-0, Operations, defines military power in narrow traditional terms and extends the legacy argument that the military sets conditions
while other elements of national power complete operations (despite a notable unavailability or ineffectiveness of these elements in recent conflicts).
Military power alone cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee stable
peace. It must, however, establish global, regional, and local conditions that allow the other instruments of national power—diplomatic,
informational, and economic—to exert their full influence.30

Not only does this description of military power neglect what the Army was
called upon to do in OIF and OEF, it also fails to account for operations in
regions or environments where there is an absence of any government or
centralized, responsible decision-makers—a fundamental possibility in future military operations. Diplomatic and economic instruments of national
power are decidedly less effective in ungoverned areas or against complex
insurgencies devoid of any discernible leadership.
The quotation from FM 3-0 contradicts that outlined in the same publication as the Army’s new operational concept: “The Army’s new operational concept has changed Army operations significantly. All operations are now
full-spectrum operations.”31 FM 1, The Army, indicates a similar respect for
a doctrinal shift in favor of current operations: “The skills and organizations
required for operations against today’s threats are different from those of the
recent past. The twentieth century required an Army with a large capacity focused on combat capabilities. Today’s operational environment requires an
Army with more diverse capabilities as well as the capacity for sustained operations.”32 The first description (from FM 3-0) of what military power cannot do differs substantially from what the Army has been required to do and
what doctrine says it should do. This description of military power is less of
a “new operational concept” than it is an old operational concept repackaged
in ambiguous terms. Setting conditions for a stable peace does not obviate
responsibility for then establishing and enforcing that peace, and recent operations attest to this fact.
Even though it was published in 2008, FM 3-0 defines concepts, terms,
and conditions more relevant to 1989 than the post-9/11 international security
environment. The talking points used in newer versions of operational doctrine have been updated and duly note that full-spectrum capabilities are now
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a priority (although, at least rhetorically, full-spectrum operations have been
a “priority” since 1991 or earlier). As Thom Shanker describes:
The Pentagon will adopt a new strategy that for the first time orders
the military to anticipate that future conflicts will include a complex
mix of conventional, set-piece battles and campaigns against shadowy insurgents and terrorists, according to senior officials. The shift
is intended to assure that the military is prepared to deal with a spectrum of possible threats.33

A description of what full-spectrum operations entail (continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks)
is outlined in both FMs 3-0 and 3-07.34
Despite these additions and a renewed emphasis on full-spectrum operations, doctrine remains flawed. The lexicon used in doctrinal publications
(to include terms defined in Joint Publication 1-02) still reflect an institutional
bias for combat operations despite contemporary operational and strategic requirements. This lack of a common and relevant lexicon, particularly in the
case of simultaneous full-spectrum operations, can cause significant problems
beyond the confusion created by the ineffective meshing of old concepts with
new operational realities. According to Major Michael Davidson, if EffectsBased Operations lexicon is used, “for instance, in a disaster-relief mission,
the military viewing all the inhabitants of a country as ‘enemy decision-makers’ may conflict with the view of the people held by several nongovernmental
agencies assisting in the relief effort. This conflict of viewpoints could negatively affect the effective planning and execution of the mission.”35 Language
is important because it symbolizes perceptions, intentions, and actions. Concepts are equally important. Breaking asunder simultaneous full-spectrum operations into constituent parts creates an impression that operations are indeed
separable and can be planned and trained for separately. Delineating between
offensive, defensive, and stability operations does not really capture the complexity of the contemporary operational environment and often leads Army
units into supposing that these operations can be tangibly or cognitively separated, as they appear in doctrine. The definitions and conceptual descriptions
of operations presented in doctrine are vital to the successful conduct of operations; they shape perceptions and are used as authoritative guides for planning, training, and execution. Flaws that are the result of challenges associated
with the meshing of old and new concepts have to be eliminated lest they allow for improper interpretation and confusion.
Doctrine provides the fundamental principles by which military or
other elements of national power render support of national objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgment in application. If doctrine is flawed, it
can inappropriately direct military forces in a fashion that does not support
national objectives. If varying elements of doctrine are out of synch, military forces can become confused as to appropriateness, regardless of whether
56
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new doctrine is prefaced with language indicating what is being superseded.
This omission has created a fundamental flaw in the Army’s post-Cold War
and post-9/11 doctrine. The military
has failed to properly, comprehensiveMilitary power alone
ly, and temporally synchronize military
cannot,
by itself, restore or
actions with national objectives across
guarantee stable peace.
the full range of its doctrinal publications.
In a rapidly changing security environment, doctrine should be dynamic but not to the point that it is in constant flux. Without some continuity, doctrine does not provide fundamental principles; instead, it generates
confusion, disrupting training and operational effectiveness. But doctrinal
concepts should be reevaluated in light of current strategic requirements
and operational realities. The publication of doctrine (and the terms and
concepts therein) needs to be synchronized and on a timetable that is long
enough to ensure relevance and yet short enough to allow for changes created by the operational environment, lessons-learned, or strategic shifts. Doctrine that is confusing, out of date, or in conflict with other doctrinal sources
causes substantial problems, limiting the adaptability of organizations (they
are either improperly informed or are training to standards and concepts that
are no longer relevant). It also can disrupt the planning and training for specific operations (terms and tasks do not exist or are useless in simultaneous
full-spectrum operations).
Conclusion
Manifestly, combat is being supplanted by stability as the principal
task for US Army forces in light of ongoing changes in the international security environment. This fact does not diminish the importance of combat
capabilities. But combat capabilities and skills should not be viewed through
the traditional legacy lens. Instead, they should be considered as one tool that
enables organizational adaptation in support of national security. Combat capabilities, in conjunction with other full-spectrum capabilities, help secure
strategic objectives by suppressing adaptive threat organizations. Although
the US Army’s traditional mission has been to “fight and win the nation’s
major wars,” it now needs to focus on maintaining and accelerating its adaptive capacity to achieve differing levels of stability through the prosecution
of simultaneous full-spectrum operations. Defending and securing national
interests and security by supporting national strategy is the Army’s principal
mission. Although fighting and winning the nation’s wars is indispensable, the
Army needs to be capable of enmeshing this capability within the full range of
operations, simultaneously. This objective can be accomplished by exploiting the Army’s newfound adaptability and the full-spectrum capabilities reSpring 2010
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sulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom while consciously avoiding the inertia
of its combat legacy. Adjusting strategy and doctrine to reflect the importance
of adaptation in achieving full-spectrum capabilities is an appropriate starting point for blunting the effects of the combat legacy on the current force.
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